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ABSTRACT 
 
Increasing evidence shows that hospital competition under fixed prices can improve quality 
and reduce cost. Concerns remain, however, that competition may undermine socio-economic 
equity in the utilisation of care. We test this hypothesis in the context of the pro-competition 
reforms of the English National Health Service progressively introduced from 2004 to 2006. 
We use a panel of 32,482 English small areas followed from 2003 to 2008 and a difference in 
differences approach. The effect of competition on equity is identified by the interaction 
between market structure, small area income deprivation and year. We find a negative 
association between market competition and elective admissions in deprived areas. The effect 
of pro-competition reform was to reduce this negative association slightly, suggesting that 
competition did not undermine equity. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a substantial body of economic theory and evidence about the effects of competition 
on the cost and quality of hospital care (Gaynor, 2006).  It is known, for instance, that 
competition can improve quality (Kessler and McClellan, 2000) though not if buyers have 
poor information about quality (Propper et al., 2008).  Less is known, however, about the 
effects of competition on socio-economic inequality in hospital care (Cookson et al., 2010).  
We aim to provide some evidence in the context of the pro-competition reforms of the 
universal and comprehensive English National Health Service (NHS) between 2003 and 
2008. 
 
 
The reforms were introduced by a Labour administration led by Prime Minister Tony Blair 
and his Chancellor Gordon Brown, who subsequently became Prime Minister from 2007-10.  
These “Blair/Brown” reforms fostered competition in two main ways.  First, on the supply 
side, independent sector (IS) hospitals were encouraged gradually to enter the market for 
NHS funded patients: we estimate that IS activity made up 0.03% of NHS non-emergency 
inpatient activity in 2003/4 rising to 2.17% by 2008/9.  Second, on the demand side, patients 
were offered a choice of hospital from December 2005 and case based hospital payment was 
gradually phased in from 2003/4 to 2008/9 so that money would follow the patient’s choice 
(Department of Health, 2003).  Prime Minister Blair predicted his reforms would enhance 
equity for poorer patients, by increasing hospital capacity and patient choice (Blair, 2003).  
By contrast, critics predicted that choice and independent sector provision would undermine 
socio-economic equity (Appleby et al., 2003; Barr et al., 2008; Oliver and Evans, 2005; 
Tudor-Hart, 2006).  Evidence on the equity effects of competition is timely, as at the time of 
writing the English NHS is embarking upon another controversial programme of pro-
competition reform under the coalition administration of Conservative Prime Minister David 
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Cameron and Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg (Department of Health, 
2010, Whitehead et al. 2010). 
 
In providing evidence of this kind, one key challenge lies in disentangling the effects of 
hospital competition on socio-economic equity from the effects of other contemporaneous 
changes in the health system and the wider social and economic environment.  For example, 
the rapid growth in NHS spending and capacity during the 2000s may have tended to 
improve socio-economic equity in hospital care, if activity was able to grow faster in 
deprived areas with greater unmet need.  Changes in the wider socio-economic environment 
may also have played a role, for example improved access to web-based information and the 
ageing of the consumerist “baby boomer” generation.  Our research design aims to 
disentangle the specific effects of competition from these broader influences on socio-
economic equity in hospital care. 
 
We identify the effect of competition on utilisation of hospital services by exploiting 
geographical variation in the “dose” of competition generated by the introduction of the pro-
competition reforms, as measured by change in market concentration.  Indices of local market 
concentration are constructed by computing hospital level indices based on both observed and 
predicted patient flows, and then attributing these to small areas using distance-weighted 
averages.  As one would expect, the pro-competition Blair/Brown reforms were accompanied 
by a general fall in hospital market concentration throughout the period as competition set in.  
However, local market concentration changes by different amounts in different parts of the 
country and over different points in time.  Towards the beginning of the reform period, 
change in local market concentration is very small and reflects variation in local demand and 
supply factors.  As the pro-competition reforms are gradually phased in, however, fairly large 
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and widespread falls in local market concentration are observed which are likely to reflect 
increases in competitive pressure.  We can therefore identify the effect of competition by 
comparing geographical differences in the magnitude of change in market concentration 
before and during the introduction of pro-competition reforms using a difference in 
differences (DID) approach. 
 
The second key challenge lies in measuring change in socio-economic equity in hospital care, 
and doing so in a way that can be linked to change in local hospital market concentration.  
Conventional individual level survey data approaches are unable to include adequately large 
samples of individuals using hospital care each year in all local hospital markets in England.  
We therefore use administrative data on all individuals aged 18 and over who used hospital 
care in the English NHS from 2003 to 2008, comprising a total of 37.7 million elective 
inpatient hospital admissions.  Unfortunately, this data cannot be linked to individual level 
data on socio-economic status in England.  Therefore, we aggregate to the level of 32,482 
English small areas with average population of 1,500 and use available indices of small area 
socioeconomic deprivation. 
 
The concept of equity we examine is small area socio-economic equality in health care 
utilisation for equal need.  We estimate fixed effect linear panel data models of small area 
hospital utilisation as a function of population need, deprivation and market structure.  The 
competition effects on equity are identified by examining how the interaction between market 
structure and deprivation changes over time.  Changes in equity over time can be more 
robustly identified than levels of equity at a given point in time.  Levels of equity are hard to 
quantify in cross sectional analysis because one has to assume that observed utilisation 
inequalities relative to need are not biased by unobserved heterogeneity in population need.  
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By contrast, our identification of equity effects rests on the more reasonable assumption that 
unobserved heterogeneity in population need between more and less deprived areas remains 
stable from one year to the next. Cookson et al (in press) measure inequality in utilisation of 
hospital care at the small area level in England between 2001 and 2008 and provide a 
discussion on the differences between level and trend inequality analysis. 
To facilitate the discussion throughout the paper, we interpret a relative increase in hospital 
utilisation in deprived areas as a beneficial improvement in socio-economic equity, and a 
relative decrease as a harmful deterioration in socio-economic equity. 
2 Background 
 
2.1 The Blair/Brown pro-competition reforms of the English NHS 
The Blair/Brown reforms involved both supply side and demand side mechanisms for 
introducing hospital competition.  On the supply side, independent sector (IS) providers were 
encouraged to enter the market for publicly funded NHS patients, initially through the 
“Independent Sector Treatment Centre” programmeme of nationally agreed contracts with 
generous terms (Mason et al., 2010).  This reform was introduced in 2003/4, but IS providers 
only started to provide more than 1% of NHS activity from 2006/7 - we estimate that IS 
activity made up 0.03% of NHS non-emergency inpatient activity in 2003/4, rising to 0.08% 
in 2004/5, 0.31% in 2005/6, 1.12% in 2006/7, 1.42% in 2007/8 and 2.17% in 2008/9.1  Prior 
to this reform, IS provision of NHS funded services was mostly sub-contracted on an ad hoc 
basis by publicly funded NHS hospitals at times of capacity shortage, for example to perform 
“waiting list initiatives” to clear patient backlogs, rather than routinely offered on a 
competitive basis. 
                                                 
1
 Source: Hospital Episodes Statistics. 
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On the demand side, patient choice of hospital at the point of GP referral was phased in 
nationally from December 2005.  The policy was that from December 2005 all patients 
should be offered a choice of four or five hospitals including one independent sector 
provider, leading up to “free choice” of any public or independent hospital in the NHS 
national directory from April 2008 (Dixon et al., 2010).  This was coupled with a national 
system of fixed price case based hospital payment based on a local variant of DRGs 
(“Healthcare Resource Groups”), which was gradually phased in nationally from 2003/4 for a 
small basket of elective inpatient services and progressively expanded to include all elective 
services in 2005/6.  The financial impact of this policy on hospital revenue was also gradual 
with a four year transition path which came to an end in 2008/9.  Prior to these reforms, NHS 
patients largely had to accept whatever referral their GP made for them and hospitals were 
largely paid on the basis of block contracts negotiated with local public agencies (“Primary 
Care Trusts”) responsible for purchasing health care on behalf of the local population. 
 
All of these reforms were introduced alongside substantial growth in NHS expenditure.  From 
1999 to 2010, real annual NHS spending growth averaged 6.56% compared with 3.48% from 
1950/01 to 1999 (Appleby et al., 2009).  Between 2003 and 2008, real net expenditure on the 
NHS in England grew by 30.1% from 72.7 to 92.5 billion in GBP sterling at 2008 prices, 
with real annual spending growth of  9.4% in 2003, 4.7% in 2004, 7.8% in 2005, 3.2% in 
2006, 7.8% in 2007 and 3.6% in 2008 (House of Commons Health Committee, 2010).  The 
reforms were also introduced alongside a strong target-based performance management 
regime for hospitals involving publication of data on performance against target and 
associated rewards and sanctions for hospital managers.  In particular, hospital managers 
were strongly incentivised to meet an aggressive sequence of maximum waiting time targets 
for elective inpatient treatment: 18 months from outpatient consultation to inpatient treatment 
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by March 2001, falling by three months a year to 12 months by March 2003, 9 months by 
March 2004, then 6 months by December 2005 and ultimately to 18 weeks from GP referral 
to inpatient treatment by December 2008 (Department of Health, 2000, 2004).  There is 
evidence that these reforms increased hospital competition and that this competition 
improved hospital quality (Cooper et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2010).  However, there is no 
evidence about the effects of hospital competition during the Blair/Brown reform period on 
socio-economic equity. 
 
2.2  Economic theory on the relationship between competition and equity 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis that fixed price competition in the context of universal health 
insurance tends to undermine socioeconomic equity in health care.  This is an empirically 
driven hypothesis motivated by policy debates between critics and proponents of pro-
competition reform in health care, rather than a theoretically driven hypothesis motivated by 
economic theory.  Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether economic theory can 
elucidate this hypothesis. 
 
Economic theory offers competing predictions about the relationship between competition 
and socioeconomic status.  For example, increased competition could in theory improve 
equity by increasing activity volumes, if the marginal patient brought into the market is a 
low-income one.  In what follows, however, we describe three possible theoretical 
explanations for why competition in the context of the English NHS might undermine equity 
in health care. 
 
Reduced rent for pursuing equity objectives 
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Hospital objective functions might be partially benevolent, incorporating concern for equity 
in health care.  As a result, hospitals may seek to make implicit transfers to relatively sick or 
poor or otherwise disadvantaged individuals.  In theory, hospital competition might therefore 
undermine equity by reducing the rents available to hospitals for making implicit transfers of 
this kind.  In a US context, the implicit transfers might take the form of price discrimination 
against well-insured individuals and in favour of under-insured individuals.  In an English 
NHS context of universal insurance coverage and fixed prices, by contrast, the implicit 
transfers might take the form of treating unprofitable high-cost patients – i.e. refraining from 
engaging in profit-maximising “creaming” and “dumping” behaviour (Ellis 1998).  If poor 
patients are more expensive to treat within the HRG service provided – for example, because 
they are harder to discharge – and hence relatively unprofitable to treat under a fixed price 
system, then competition may reduce the rent available to managers to make implicit 
transfers to such patients by treating them.  This could lead to creaming and dumping 
behaviour which could take the form of tighter hospital admission thresholds for such 
patients for elective care, resulting in reduced treatment volumes and not merely diversion of 
patients from one hospital to another.  However, evidence that poor patients cost substantially 
more is mixed (Epstein et al., 1990; Cookson et al., 2011). 
 
Crowding out of pro-social motivation 
Critics of pro-competition reform often warn that competition might erode the pro-social 
motivation of hospital managers and clinicians, with harmful consequences for equity (Tudor 
Hart 2006).  According to the behavioural economic theory of “motivation crowding out” 
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), the introduction of incentive mechanisms with “extrinsic” 
rewards and punishments – such as competition – may cause pro-social motivation to be 
crowded out by self-interested motivation.  To put it in Le Grand’s colourful terminology, 
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competition may encourage hospital managers and clinicians to behave more like self-
interested “knaves” than pro-social “knights” (Le Grand, 2003).  As before, however, this 
explanation only makese sense in the context of universal health insurance and fixed prices if 
poor patients cost more and are less profitable to treat. 
 
Choice and waiting times 
Waiting times and waiting lists are used as a rationing mechanism to regulate access to 
hospital care in England, and before the introduction of the reform a large number of patients 
were waiting longer than 12 months for treatment.  Thus, the early political debate on 
competition focused on the potential role of patient choice in reducing waiting times. 
Opponents of the reform argued that patient choice of provider would advantage skilled 
patients from higher socioeconomic groups, since they face lower costs in accessing 
information and have greater willingness to travel away from their local hospital provider in 
order to get their treatment quicker. This in turn would result in a larger volume of services 
being allocated to such patients every year as compared with socioeconomically 
disadvantaged patients who face higher costs in exercising choice and hence are more likely 
to stay on the waiting list of their local hospital provider.  In contrast, advocates of reform 
claim that this sort of two tier system was already in place before the introduction of 
competition, with socioeconomically advantaged individuals travelling longer distances 
(Propper et al 2007) in order to obtain their treatment in hospitals with shorter waiting times 
(Laudicella et al. 2012, Cooper et al 2009). The introduction of choice and competition would 
then benefit socioeconomically disadvantaged patients by making it easier for them to choose 
hospitals with shorter waiting times (Dixon and Le Grand, 2006). 
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3 Data 
Table 1 presents global descriptive statistics for the main small area level variables, pooled 
from 2003 to 2008, and table 2 presents year-by-year means.  The unit of analysis is the 
Lower Super Output Area (LSOA).  There are 32,482 LSOAs in England with a mean 
population of about 1,500 individuals and a minimum of 1,000.   
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
3.1 Hospital utilisation 
Our hospital utilisation variable is based on data from the national Hospital Episode Statistics 
(HES) inpatient database, which covers all hospital patients admitted to hospital in the 
English NHS.  All elective (non-emergency) inpatient admissions were extracted for 
individuals aged 18 and over in financial years 2003/4 through 2008/9.  We focus on acute 
hospital elective admissions excluding admissions to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and mental 
health care trusts.  Anonymous records were extracted by financial year and summed to the 
patient’s small area of residence.  Observations were excluded if there were missing data 
fields for small area or age, which occurred in a very small proportion of cases (fewer than 
0.1%), or if there were duplicate records or other forms of multiple counting of episodes for 
the same admission.  Records were linked in the form of Continuous Inpatient Spells that 
include transfers between consultant and hospital within same admission spell (Castelli et al., 
2008).  We included all relevant providers of NHS hospital care, including Independent 
Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) under national contracts and Independent Sector providers 
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under local contracts.  As discussed later, ISTC activity reporting is incomplete, especially 
from 2003/4 to 2006/7. 
 
Year by year utilisation rates per 100,000 population for all elective adult inpatient hospital 
utilisation are reported in Table 2, based on mid-year population estimates from the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS). 
3.2 Indices of hospital market structure 
We measure market structure using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of hospital market 
concentration. The index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all hospitals in 
the market, and normally ranges from 0 (max market dispersion) to 10,000 (max market 
concentration). 
 
In our analysis, a “hospital” is defined as either an NHS Trust (a group of local public 
hospital sites funded and managed under the same organisational umbrella) or an independent 
sector provider site.  Our data on market shares include patient flows to both NHS Trusts and 
IS sites; though in sensitivity analysis we also construct indices based on NHS Trusts only. 
 
We calculate two versions of the HHI using two different approaches. The first is based on 
observed patient flows from their GP practice2 to the hospital, and is calculated separately for 
each year from 2003 to 2008 as described in Appendix 1.  The “observed HHI” assumes the 
GP practice is the relevant market unit since in the English hospital market patients access 
elective care through a referral from their GP. Also, a number of surveys conducted by the 
Department of Health show that the patient’s GP is the most important source of information 
                                                 
2
 This is the medical practice where the patient is registered for accessing primary care. 
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when patients choose the hospital for their treatment3.  However, GPs received specific 
guidelines to offer at least four alternative hospitals to their patients and they have no 
incentives for establishing exclusive relations with one particular hospital.  Also, patients can 
“choose and book” completely autonomously using an internet booking facility that provides 
information on hospital services, distance and waiting times. In sensitivity analysis, we 
therefore also calculate an alternative version of this index using the patient small area of 
residence (i.e. the LSOA) as the initial market unit in place of the GP practices. We find a 
90% correlation between these two versions of the observed concentration index. This is not 
surprising given that patients typically choose a GP practice close to their home in order to 
minimize travel costs.  
 
The second version of the HHI is based on predicted probabilities of patients being admitted 
to any hospital. Estimated probabilities are based on the interaction between exogenous 
patient and hospital characteristics that are likely to influence the patient’s choice of hospital. 
Therefore, the “predicted HHI” is purged of potential bias from unobservable patient and 
hospital characteristics, such as hospital quality or patient health status. This index is based 
on the works of Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) and is 
described in Appendix 2. We construct the predicted HHI using observations in 2003 and 
2008 only, since its calculation requires a considerable amount of data and computer 
resources. 
 
Finally, we compute a time varying index of independent sector penetration, in order to test 
the hypothesis that apparent effects of competition are an artefact of increases in local 
hospital capacity rather than a real increase in competition.  This index simply counts the 
                                                 
3
 Reports on the National Patient Choice Survey, July, December, January 2008. 
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number of independent sector providers within a 60km fixed radius distance from the LSOA 
demographic centroid.  We also conduct sensitivity analysis using a 15km, 30km and 45km 
radius and including IS providers with at least 1,000 NHS patient admissions only, though we 
are not able to produce an indicator of IS penetration based on the number of beds due to lack 
of data on IS providers.  We find that the largest impact on elective admissions is obtained 
using a 60Km radius and including all IS providers with at least 100 NHS patient admissions. 
3.3 Area deprivation 
Small area socio-economic status is measured using the income deprivation domain of the 
English Indices of Deprivation 2007 (Noble et al., 2008).  This index indicates the proportion 
of individuals resident in the LSOA in the year 2004 who were living in low income 
households.  Low income households are defined as those either receiving means-tested low 
income out-of-work benefits (including income support, income-based job seeker’s 
allowance, pension credit guarantee, and subsistence or accommodation support from the 
national asylum support service) or receiving means-tested low income in-work benefits 
(including working families tax credit and child tax credit) and whose equivalised income is 
below 60% of the median before housing costs.  The index was produced by the Social 
Disadvantage Research Centre at the University of Oxford for the Department of 
Communities and Local Government. 
 
We use this index because it is easy to interpret on a cardinal scale suitable for regression 
analysis and does not include any health related variables that might introduce circularity into 
the modelling.  For most of the analysis, we treat this index as a cardinal variable. This allows 
us to take account of the full socio-economic distribution and avoids the potential selection 
biases associated with focusing on ratios or gaps between arbitrarily defined extreme groups.  
In one illustrative graph, however, we use this index to categorise small areas as “deprived” 
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or “non-deprived” in terms of the absolute proportion of individuals living in low income 
households: (1) 0-20% (“low deprivation”) and (2) 20% or more (“high deprivation”).  This 
generates two unequally sized groups comprising 72.2% and 27.8% of small areas 
respectively.  We also conduct a sensitivity analysis using the Economic Deprivation Index 
(Noble et al., 2009).  This index measures income deprivation among individuals aged under 
60 and is time-varying for the first three years of our period from 2003 to 2005 but frozen 
thereafter for the next three years. 
 
3.4 Need and GP supply variables 
We control for a range of time varying small area need variables including population size, 
age-sex structure, and disease prevalence.  We use ONS mid-year population estimates in 5 
year age-sex bands (from 15-19 to 85 plus).  Our disease prevalence variables are (from 
2003-8) cancer, chronic kidney disease, coronary heart disease, diabetes, epilepsy, 
hypertension, hypothyroidism, stroke, transient ischaemic attack and (from 2006-8) atrial 
fibrillation, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, obesity and heart failure.  Estimates of 
disease prevalence at the GP practice level are obtained from data collected in the process of 
administering the pay for performance scheme for GPs in the NHS introduced in 2004/5, 
known as the “Quality and Outcomes Framework” (QOF).  The data cover nearly all GP 
practices in England, and are extracted from disease registers submitted to the national 
Quality Management and Analysis System (QMAS).  The data show the proportion of 
individuals registered to the GP practice who are recorded as having the disease in question.  
We attribute this to the small area level using the Attribution Dataset of patient registration 
addresses within GP practices.  The attribution process assumes that prevalence for a 
particular small area is a weighted sum of the prevalence in each GP practice serving that 
small area, with weights proportional to the number of small area residents registered with 
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each GP practice.  Both the QOF data and practice to small area attribution data were 
obtained from the NHS Information Centre.  Eight of the twelve variables we use are 
available from 2004/5, though four of them (atrial fibrillation, chronic kidney disease, heart 
failure and obesity) are only available from 2006/7 following a revision to the QOF scheme.  
Most of the disease prevalence variables are based on the full population of patients 
registered with the GP practice.   However, diabetes prevalence is based on patients aged 17 
and over; epilepsy and chronic kidney disease is based on patients aged 18 and over; and 
obesity prevalence is based on patients aged 16 and over. 
 
We also control for time varying GP supply, by computing GPs per 10,000 population.  This 
variable is based on GP practice level administrative data on whole time equivalent GPs per 
registered patient, from the General Medical Services database.  This GP practice level 
variable is then attributed to LSOA level using the same procedure described above, as a 
weighted average based on the share of GP practice registered patients resident in the LSOA.  
4 Methods 
We model small area utilisation as a function of local market structure, a time trend, and 
population demographic and need variables.  We use small area level fixed effects to allow 
for unobserved heterogeneity between small areas in local supply and demand factors that did 
not change between 2003 and 2008.  The effect of each explanatory variable is therefore 
identified using within-area variation over time rather than between-area variation in global 
mean levels of the variables across all periods.  We use a fixed effects specification in order 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity between small areas in time invariant characteristics 
likely to be correlated with local market structure, such as historical supply and demand 
factors that generate between-area variations in global mean utilisation, market structure and 
need.   
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Our small area level regression equation can be written: 
                                                           ሺ                                                           ሻ   ሺ ሻ                        (1) 
  
Where:  
ity
 
is the utilisation count in small area i in year t. 
dispersionit  is an index of market dispersion obtained by multiplying the HHI by -1/100. 
deprivationi  is the time invariant index of small area income deprivation.  ሺ ሻ  is an indicator function of the post reform period that takes value equals 1 in the 
financial year 2008 and zero in 20034.       is a vector of time varying control variables, including need variables (small area 
population size and demographic characteristics and prevalence of diseases) and supply 
variables (number of independent sector hospitals within 60km and whole time equivalent GP 
numbers).     is the small area fixed effect. 
 
In all regression models, we use an index of market dispersion obtained simply by 
multiplying the HHI concentration index by a constant term (-1/100) so that the index 
measures increasing market dispersion rather than concentration and ranges from -100 
(minimum market dispersion, i.e. monopoly) to 0 (maximum market dispersion). This 
facilitates the interpretation of the model coefficients        and   in terms of marginal 
                                                 
4
 Our preferred model specification includes 2003 and 2008 years only. We also estimate alternative model 
specifications including all observations from 2003 to 2008 using 2003 as baseline. 
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effects of increasing market dispersion and increasing competition rather than increasing 
concentration and decreasing competition. Also, we treat income deprivation as a continuous 
variable on a scale of 0 to 100.  
 
We estimate the effect of competition on equity using two model specifications based on 
equation (1). The first model uses an index of dispersion based on the observed HHI and 
estimates the year by year impact of competition as the reform is gradually phased in from 
2003 to 2008. The second model uses an index of market dispersion based on the predicted 
HHI and is estimated using observations before (2003) and during the reform implementation 
(2008) only. The predicted HHI allows for a more accurate identification of the competition 
effect, although this index requires intensive calculations and thus we limit the analysis to 
two years only. Details of the construction of observed and predicted HHI are given in 
Appendix 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
The effect of competition on socio-economic equity is identified using a three-way 
interaction term between the indicator of local market dispersion, the indicator of small area 
deprivation, and a year dummy variable capturing the introduction of the competition reform.  
The estimated coefficient   (“theta”) on this crucial three-way interaction term can be 
interpreted as the effect of competition on utilisation by increasing level of deprivation.  Or, 
equivalently, it can be interpreted as the effect of deprivation on utilisation by increasing 
levels of competition. 
 
The baseline effect of deprivation on utilisation is not identified by our fixed effect model 
since our indicator of deprivation is not time varying. However, we can identify change over 
time in the effect of deprivation, based on within-area change over time in utilisation.  The 
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coefficient   (“phi”) on the deprivationi*  ሺ ሻ term can be interpreted as the difference in the 
effect of income deprivation on utilisation between 2008 and 2003 (the baseline year) for 
small areas in highly dispersed markets (the baseline market structure).  A negative 
coefficient would indicate a relative decrease in utilisation among deprived areas in dispersed 
markets since 2003 – which can be interpreted as a harmful decline in socio-economic equity 
– and vice versa. 
 
The coefficient   on the                           term identifies the effect of local 
market dispersion by increasing level of income deprivation in 2003 (the baseline year).  This 
coefficient captures the effect of market dispersion on socio-economic equity before the 
introduction of the competition reform.   Such an effect cannot be attributed to competition, 
however, since in 2003 patients were not allowed to choose the hospital for their treatment 
and hospitals have no incentives to compete to attract their patients.  Instead, it can be 
attributed to other local supply and demand factors that influence the degree of market 
dispersion in 2003 – such as hospital re-configurations and changes in GP referral patterns for 
reasons unconnected with competition, such as waiting time targets. 
 
After 2005, however, change in dispersion starts to be more closely related to competitive 
pressure, as competition is introduced and starts to influence local market dispersion5.  The 
effect of competition on socio-economic equity can therefore be identified by the coefficient   on the                            ሺ ሻ term. This coefficient identifies the change in 
how dispersion modifies the effect of deprivation on utilisation before and after the 
introduction of the competition reform, namely the effect of competition on equity. A 
positive coefficient indicates that post-reform competition increases utilisation by more 
                                                 
5
 Our time unit of analysis is the UK financial year. Each financial year spans from April to March, hence the 
competition reform is already in operation in the last 3 months of the financial year 2005.    
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where the level of deprivation is greater. This can be interpreted as competition having a 
positive effect on equity – rather than leading to “over-treatment” in deprived areas – since 
other studies have shown that deprived areas use less heath care service than needed (Dixon 
et al., 2007).  In contrast, a negative coefficient indicates that competition reduces utilisation 
in more deprived areas and thus has a negative effect on equity. In sensitivity analysis, we 
calculate the interaction effect in each of the 2003-2008 years.  So the estimated coefficients 
show the full pattern of changes over time in the relationship between market dispersion and 
deprivation.  
 
Other coefficients of interest include the baseline dispersion coefficient,  , which indicates 
the marginal effect of market dispersion on utilisation in 2003 for small areas with no income 
deprivation (i.e. at the baseline), and the dispersion-year coefficient,   , which indicates the 
change in this marginal effect over time for the same small areas. 
 
Our identification of the effect of competition is obtained through the within small area 
variation in the level of market dispersion that is generated by the introduction of the reform. 
Before the reform, English health markets are hierarchically controlled systems where 
patients cannot choose providers and the latter are not in competition to attract patients. 
Variations in market dispersion are very small, and are associated with variations in demand 
and supply factors rather than variations in hospital competition. Pro-competition reform then 
changes the market structure, inducing an exogenous change to the level of market dispersion 
that affects some areas more than others. Therefore, the reform provides a natural experiment 
allowing us to identify the effect of competition.  
 
20 
 
Identification of the effect of competition on elective admissions can be achieved 
straightforwardly, in the absence of time variant unobservable confounders correlated with 
market dispersion, under the standard “parallel trends” assumption of the DID estimator. 
However, the effect of competition on elective admission is not the focus of this paper.  The 
identification of the effect of competition on equity, i.e. the parameter  , is obtained 
assuming absence of unobservable time variant confounders correlated both with market 
structure and deprivation.  This assumption is slightly different than the standard 
identification hypothesis of DID estimators.  Time variant policy confounders are allowed to 
be correlated with market dispersion or deprivation as long as they are not correlated with 
both.  For instance, imagine the implementation of the competition reform were accompanied 
by extra health care resources in areas with highly dispersed markets.  This would lead to bias 
in the estimated effect of competition on utilisation (i.e. coefficients   and  ). However, the 
effect of competition on equity (i.e. coefficient  ) can still be identified provided that the 
extra funding is randomly allocated between deprived and non-deprived areas. Identification 
of the effect of competition on equity is achieved by subtracting the effect of market 
dispersion from the effect of deprivation pre and post the introduction of the reform.  
Therefore, the coefficient   is still identified even when the coefficients   and   are not, 
provided that the bias affects deprived and non-deprived areas equally.6 Therefore, the 
identification assumption of the three-way interaction term is similar to the DDD estimator. 
 
One of the confounders potentially capable of influencing the relationship between 
deprivation, competition and utilisation could be the entry of independent sector providers 
into NHS market during this period. Independent sector providers were authorised and 
                                                 
6
 Equivalently, if a flow of extra funding is injected in income deprived areas over time, then the identification 
of the effect of deprivation on utilisation will be biased (i.e. coefficient  ), but the effect of competition on 
equity can be still identified. 
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incentivised to enter hospital markets with lack of supply, which were often characterised by 
low market dispersion and located in income deprived areas. We control for this potential 
confounding effect by including in the regression analysis a time varying indicator of 
independent sector penetration in the local hospital markets. The indicator counts the number 
of independent sector providers within 60Km fix radius distance from the small area.  
 
The functional form of the model in Equation 1 allows for the separate identification of all 
the parameters of interest.  In sensitivity analysis, we relax this assumption by fixing market 
dispersion at pre-reform level in 2003 and interacting pre-reform market dispersion with 
deprivation and time7: 
     ሺ                                                         ሻ   ሺ ሻ                         (2) 
 
Equation 2 assumes that pre-reform market characteristics are exogenous and allows for the 
identification of the main parameter of interest θ, i.e. the effect of competition on equity. 
However, equation 2 cannot identify the association between market dispersion and 
utilisation (δ) and market dispersion and equity (ω) at the baseline year 2003. 
5  Results 
5.1 Change in hospital market structure between 2003 and 2008 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis pooled from 2003 to 
2008. The HHI scale ranges from 0 (infinite market dispersion) to 10,000 (monopoly) and 
shows global mean of 5,747 points in the pooled 2003-2008 years. Before the introduction of 
                                                 
7
 We thank an anonymous referee for this comment. 
22 
 
the competition reform markets are highly concentrated and variations in the HHI are very 
small as shown in Table 2. The mean of the HHI index remains virtually unchanged from 
2003 to 2004 at 5,900 and 5,883 points respectively. After the introduction of competition, 
however, market concentration starts a progressively to fall to 5,715 points in 2006 and 5,490 
in 2008. The HHI is calculated using observed patients flows from GP practice to hospitals as 
described in Appendix 1.  Figure 1 shows two maps of hospital market concentration in 
England: the left hand map shows baseline level of concentration in 2003 and the right hand 
map shows change between 2003 and 2008.  The left hand map shows that, as one might 
expect, baseline market concentration tends to be low in and around densely populated cities 
served by many different hospitals, such as London, Bristol, Birmingham, Liverpool, 
Manchester and Newcastle.  However, the right hand map shows that change in market 
concentration – which we use to identify competition – exhibits quite a different geographical 
pattern with relatively large increases in market dispersion in many sub-urban and rural areas.  
This is reassuring, as it shows that our identification strategy does not confuse the degree of 
competition with the baseline level of market concentration or the degree of urbanisation. 
 
Figure 1 about here (Heat map of hospital market concentration in the English NHS 
comparing baseline level in 2003 with difference 2003-8) 
5.2 Equity effects on all elective inpatient hospital utilisation 
Figure 2 shows crude annual utilisation trends in all elective inpatient admissions broken 
down by two dispersion groups (“low dispersion” and “high dispersion”) and two deprivation 
groups (“low deprivation” and “high deprivation”). 
 
Figure 2 about here (utilisation by dispersion and deprivation) 
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In 2003, “low dispersion” areas have substantially higher hospital utilisation than “high 
dispersion” areas.  Furthermore, within both dispersion groups, “high deprivation” areas have 
higher utilisation than “low deprivation” areas in 2003.  Utilisation then grows over time in 
all four groups, though more rapidly in “high dispersion” than “low dispersion” areas.  
Within the “low dispersion” group, utilisation grows faster in the “low deprivation” areas.  
By contrast, within the “high dispersion” group, utilisation grows slightly faster in the “high 
deprivation” areas.  Growth of utilisation in deprived areas was thus faster within the “high 
dispersion” group of areas than the “low dispersion” group. By 2008, the “dispersed, 
deprived” group had caught up with the “non-dispersed, deprived group”, whereas the 
“dispersed, non-deprived” group still lagged behind the “non-dispersed, non-deprived” group.  
Insofar as the “high dispersion” group is likely to face a larger increase in competitive 
pressure during the period, this is suggestive evidence that competition may have helped to 
facilitate growth in elective hospital admissions in deprived areas and thus to improve socio-
economic equity. 
 
We now turn to the regression results, to examine competition effects on equity using more 
rigorous statistical methods that control for confounding factors and are less sensitive to the 
arbitrary definition of dispersion groups and deprivation groups. 
 
Figure 3 about here (effect of dispersion on elective inpatient hospital admission) 
 
Our regression results are perhaps easiest to understand in graphical form, since the 
interaction terms can be hard to interpret.  Figure 3 shows how the marginal effect of local 
market dispersion on utilisation varies by deprivation and over time. The graph is obtained by 
plotting the coefficients estimated using model 1 (table 3).  It shows the change in total 
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elective admissions associated with a one unit change in market dispersion by deprivation 
and year. In 2003 a one unit increase in the dispersion index (i.e. a drop in the HHI of 100 
points) leaves utilisation unchanged in non-deprived areas (i.e. areas with IMD index = 0), 
decreases utilisation by 1 admission in areas with 10-20% of resident relying on income 
benefits (i.e. the average deprivation areas), and by 4 admissions in areas with over 50% of 
residents relying on income benefits (i.e. the most deprived 5% of areas). After the 
introduction of the competition reform this negative association reduces in areas with average 
deprivation and particularly in the most deprived areas, while it remains substantially 
unchanged in non deprived areas. Therefore, competition has slightly increased utilisation in 
deprived areas.  We now turn to the full regression results, for completeness. 
 
 
Table 3 about here (regression results for inpatient utilisation) 
 
Table 3 shows the results of three linear fixed effect models of all elective inpatient 
admissions. Model 1 uses the observed competition index (described in Appendix 1) and 
model 2 uses the predicted competition index (described in Appendix 2).  
 
The deprivation*year interactions show a pattern of significant and increasingly positive 
coefficients, rising to 1.339 by 2008 in model 1.  This suggests that, in the reference category 
areas with high market dispersion, the effect on admissions of a one unit increase in the 
percentage of individuals living in households on low income benefits was 1.339 higher in 
2008 than 2003.  This implies a small relative increase in the volume of utilisation received 
by people living in deprived areas, and hence implies a slight overall improvement in 
inequality during the period in line with a previous study using this dataset (Cookson et al. in 
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press).  However, this is a relatively small effect in the context of a global mean small area 
admission count of 193. Moreover, this effect is substantially smaller (0.740) in model 2 
using the predicted competition index. 
 
The dispersion*deprivation coefficient of -0.0656 in model 1 is also significant though very 
small.  There are two logically equivalent ways of interpreting this coefficient.  First, in terms 
of the effect of deprivation on utilisation, and how this is modified by dispersion.  Second, in 
terms of the effect of dispersion on utilisation, and how this is modified by deprivation.  In 
the former interpretation, this coefficient suggests that in 2003 (the baseline) a one percentage 
point increase in local hospital market dispersion modifies the effect of deprivation on 
utilisation by -0.0656 of one admission.  Equivalently, in the latter interpretation, this 
coefficient suggests that at baseline in 2003 a one percentage point increase in deprivation 
modifies the effect of local hospital dispersion by -0.0656 of one admission. However, this 
effect is much smaller (-0.0150) and no longer significant in model 2. 
 
The effect of competition on equity is captured by the crucial dispersion*deprivation*year 
terms.  These show a pattern of significant and increasingly positive coefficients (model 1) 
after the introduction of the reform.  Specifically, Model 1 and Figure 2 show zero marginal 
effects of competition on equity in 2003 and 2004, suggesting that variations in market 
dispersion are not associated with variation in elective admissions and deprivation before the 
competition reform. This result supports our identification hypothesis as described in the 
method section.  The dispersion*deprivation*year terms can be interpreted in two different 
though logically equivalent ways.  First, it suggests that competition slightly attenuated the 
negative modification effect of dispersion on the effect of deprivation on utilisation.  Second, 
it suggests that competition slightly attenuated the negative modification effect of deprivation 
26 
 
on the effect of dispersion on utilisation.  Either way, the coefficient suggests that 
competition slightly increased utilisation in deprived areas and therefore slightly improved 
socio-economic equity.  These coefficients are very small, however.  By 2008, the 
modification effect is attenuated by only 0.0155 of one admission. Model 2 provides a very 
similar estimate of the same coefficient (0.0141) suggesting that the effect of competition on 
equity is robust to the use of either the observed or the predicted competition index.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of our sensitivity analyses using a time varying index of income 
deprivation (i.e. the income domain of EDI index) and the predicted competition index. We 
obtain precisely the same pattern of results produced by model 2.  
 
Table 4 about here (regression results for time varying deprivation) 
 
Table 5 shows results of our sensitivity analysis using a competition index fixed at pre-reform 
level of market dispersion as described in Equation 2. This alternative model specification 
relaxes the functional form assumption of Model 1 and produces very similar results. 
 
Table 5 about here (regression results for time invariant dispersion) 
6 Discussion 
6.1 Main findings 
We find no evidence that increased competition in the English NHS from 2003 to 2008 had 
any harmful effect on socio-economic equity in hospital care.  If anything, we find that 
competition may have very slightly improved socio-economic equity, by helping to facilitate 
the slightly more rapid growth of elective inpatient admissions over time in deprived areas.  
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So our findings do not support the hypothesis that competition undermines socio-economic 
equity in health care as argued by the opponents of pro-competition reform. 
 
However, the increase in hospital competition between 2003 and 2008 was not large.  One 
indication of this is that hospital market concentration fell by just under 500 points in the HHI 
between 2003 and 2008, from 5,900 to 5,490.  So it remains possible that larger doses of 
competition could have important effects on socio-economic equity. 
 
We can offer two possible speculations as to why competition appears to have very slightly 
increased elective inpatient admissions in deprived areas.  One is that patient choice was 
particularly beneficial to deprived patients living in “high choice” areas with dispersed 
hospital markets, in helping them choose hospitals with lower waiting times.  In turn, this 
may have increased utilisation in those deprived areas by reducing local waiting list backlogs 
and allowing local clinicians to lower referral and treatment thresholds.  Another possible 
speculation is that competitive pressure may have generated market incentives for hospitals to 
seek out profitable new business among patients with previously unmet needs, who may 
disproportionately reside in deprived areas. However, the effect is so small as to be negligible 
from a national policy perspective, and so we cannot conclude that competition improved 
socio-economic equity to any meaningful extent. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the importance of using a fixed effect specification.  Elective inpatient 
admission rates in 2003 are substantially higher in areas with more concentrated hospital 
markets.  Since competition was only gradually introduced after 2003, this between-area 
association cannot be attributed to competition in 2003 but must instead be the result of 
unobserved historical factors.  One possible speculation is that the association may be due to 
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population growth in some metropolitan areas during the 1980s and 1990s outstripping 
growth in hospital capacity in those areas.  Those areas may therefore tend to have both low 
utilisation rates per head of population and relatively dispersed hospital markets compared 
with rural areas with low population density and few local hospitals.  Our fixed effect 
specification purges the effect of this historical between-area association from our estimates. 
 
The predicted HHI provides substantially smaller estimates of the effect of competition on 
elective admissions than the observed HHI. The former is calculated excluding potentially 
endogenous factors, such as hospital quality and waiting times. Hospitals that increase 
capacity are likely to expand their market share by lowering waiting times and hence 
becoming more appealing to patients. This might explain the difference in the estimated 
effect of competition when using the observed HHI as compared with the estimated HHI. 
However, both indices provide similar predictions of the effect of competition by deprivation 
and year. This suggests that the bias might equally affect deprived and non-deprived areas, 
and hence may cancel out in the DID setting. 
Finally, we find that allowing for IS penetration generally reduces the effect of market 
dispersion as expected, but does not affect the key coefficient on the three way interaction 
terms between market dispersion*deprivation*time under all model specifications. 
 
6.2 Methodological strengths and limitations 
One strength of our study is the use of panel data methods to identify effects of competition.  
We exploit both change in local market dispersion within small areas and change in policy 
regime to identify effects of competition.  This is more powerful than relying on cross 
sectional variation in market dispersion between small areas, which may be correlated with 
unobservable historical and geographical determinants of hospital utilisation that have 
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nothing to do with competition.  Also, our study uses a measure of competition based on 
predicted HHI as well as observed HHI. This allows for potentially endogenous factors 
influencing the patient choice of hospitals such us hospital quality and patient health status.  
 
A third strength is that our study covers all adult patients in the English NHS.  This is an 
important advantage of administrative data over survey data.  Our study is representative of 
all sections of the community including the most socio-economically deprived individuals 
who are sometimes hard to include in sample surveys.  Moreover, we have a sufficient 
number of observations to detect statistically significant changes in equity trends associated 
with changes in competition. 
 
This study also has several limitations.  First, we only observe socio-economic status at the 
level of small areas – with mean population 1,500 – and not at the level of individuals.  This 
means that we can only draw conclusions about people living in low income areas, since not 
all individuals living in low income areas have low socio-economic status.  Nevertheless, 
living in a low income area is a reasonable proxy for low socio-economic status, since 
housing in England is highly segregated by socio-economic status and LSOA boundaries 
were designed by ONS to delineate relatively homogenous small areas in terms of socio-
economic status and other social factors.  Second, we focus on hospital admissions and do not 
directly examine equity in primary care.  However, all of our hospital utilisation indicators 
potentially capture inequities arising at the primary care stage in the patient pathway.  Third, 
like all administrative datasets, HES contains coding and measurement errors.  One possible 
source of bias is missing data for Independent Sector (IS) providers.  If IS patients are less 
likely to be drawn from deprived communities, the missing data could in theory obscure 
disproportionate rises in IS activity in affluent areas.  However, mean area deprivation is not 
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much lower among IS patients than among patients treated by NHS Trusts: only 1.56 
percentage points lower in a recent study of 2007/8 data covering 78% of procedures coded 
in IS activity (Mason et al. 2010).  Furthermore, IS activity makes up a relatively small 
proportion of NHS activity in the early years of the ISTC programme when coding was 
particularly poor – less than 1% until 2006/7 – and activity coding has improved since then 
(NHS Information Centre 2009). Missing data on IS activity is thus unlikely to be sufficiently 
large proportion of total activity to bias our results.  A final limitation is that we only examine 
inequality in the volume of hospital care, as opposed to the quality and outcomes of hospital 
care.  We therefore cannot test hypotheses about effects of competition on quality of care or 
theoretical stories about deprived patients being less able than affluent patients to avoid low 
quality hospitals due to poor information and reluctance to travel long distances. 
 
6.3 Comparison with other studies 
Our main finding that hospital competition had no substantial effect on socio-economic 
equity during the Blair/Brown reforms is consistent with previous findings about the effects 
of hospital competition during the Thatcher/Major “internal market” reforms of the NHS in 
the 1990s. Using different methodologies, two small area study of NHS hospital episode 
statistics from 1991 to 2001 found that the NHS “internal market” reforms had no impact on 
socio-economic inequalities in hip replacement (Laudicella et al. 2008) and hip replacement 
and revascularisation (Cookson et al., 2010).  Like the Blair/Brown reforms, however, the 
“internal market” reforms of the 1990s involved a relatively small dose of hospital 
competition. 
 
Our findings are also consistent with studies of overall trends in small area socio-economic 
equity during the 2000s, which have generally shown no change during the period – 
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including small area socio-economic equity in waiting times for hip replacement, knee 
replacement and cataract surgery from 1999 to 2007 (Cooper et al., 2009), rates of preferred 
surgery for colorectal, breast and lung cancer between 1999 and 2006 (Raine et al., 2010) and 
rates of all elective inpatient admissions, all outpatient visits, hip replacement, cataract 
surgery, gastroscopy and coronary revascularisation (Cookson et al., in press). 
 
Taken together with the results of other studies, our results suggest that socio-economic 
patterns of health care utilisation are deeply ingrained, and that small doses of “quasi market” 
competition have little or no effect on socio-economic equity in health care in the context of 
universal and comprehensive health systems.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for key small area variables, pooled from 2003 to 2008 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome variable 
     
All elective inpatient admissions 194,700 194 87 1 1,225 
Other variables of interest 
     
Observed HHI (*) 194,700 5,747 1,149 3,184 9,095 
Predicted HHI (**) 64,900 5,561 2,331 4,054 9,625 
Independent sector hospitals within 60km 194,700 3.923 4.970 0 29 
Public hospitals within 60km 194,700 21.974 15.334 1 51 
Deprivation (IMD 2007 income domain) 194,700 15.626 12.182 0.130 83.017 
Supply variable 
     
GPs per 10,000 population 194,688 5.153 2.181 0.004 22.820 
Need variables 
     
Atrial fibrillation 194,688 1.313 0.432 0.002 3.862 
Cancer 194,688 0.837 0.376 0.000 3.158 
Chronic kidney disease 194,688 2.632 1.224 0.004 11.722 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 194,688 1.429 0.581 0.000 4.720 
Coronary heart disease 194,688 3.559 1.031 0.002 11.371 
Diabetes 194,688 3.618 0.764 0.002 9.961 
Epilepsy 194,688 0.599 0.140 0.000 2.303 
Heart failure 194,688 0.774 0.259 0.001 3.972 
Hypertension 194,688 12.182 2.511 0.006 26.771 
Hypothyroidism 194,688 2.484 0.708 0.001 6.427 
Obesity 194,688 7.563 1.965 0.011 22.327 
Stroke and transient ischaemic attack 194,688 1.580 0.502 0.001 10.106 
Total population aged 20 or over 194,700 1178 210 307 7,849 
 
Notes to table 1: 
     
1. Observations on the 32,480 Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England are pooled across all 
seven years from 2003 to 2008. 
2. Population size variables by 5 year age-sex bands not reported for reasons of space. 
(*)Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration; range from 0 (max dispersion) to 10,000 (max 
concentration). Calculation described in Appendix 1. 
(**)Predicted HHI is calculated for 2003 and 2008 only. Calculation described in Appendix 2. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by year (small area mean values) 
      
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total population aged 20 or over 1,155 1,161 1,173 1,183 1,193 1,203 
All elective inpatient admissions per 100,000 15,129 15,137 16,055 16,851 16,960 19,039 
Observed HHI (*) 5,903 5,885 5,814 5,715 5,676 5,487 
Predicted HHI (*) (**) 4,096  n/a n/a n/a n/a 4,013 
Independent sector hospitals within 60km 0.077 0.298 3.081 3.217 5.888 10.978 
Public hospitals within 60km 22.194 22.194 22.194 21.929 21.665 21.665 
 
Notes to table 2: 
(*) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration; range from 0 (max dispersion) to 10,000 (max 
concentration). Calculation described in Appendix 1. 
(**) Predicted HHI is calculated for 2003 and 2008 only. Calculation described in Appendix 2. 
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Table 3: Competition effects on equity in utilisation of elective hospital services across 
small areas.  
 
Variables
Coefficients se Coefficients se
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2008 0.0155** (0.00362) 0.0141** (0.00205)
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2007 0.0116** (0.00319) n/a n/a
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2006 0.0135** (0.00299) n/a n/a
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2005 0.00956** (0.00247) n/a n/a
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2004 0.00229 (0.00183) n/a n/a
Dispersion * 2008 0.144* (0.0733) -0.0659 (0.0444)
Dispersion * 2007 0.149* (0.0630) n/a n/a
Dispersion * 2006 0.202** (0.0594) n/a n/a
Dispersion * 2005 -0.0661 (0.0503) n/a n/a
Dispersion * 2004 -0.00485 (0.0377) n/a n/a
Deprivation * 2008 1.339** (0.216) 0.740** (0.0964)
Deprivation * 2007 1.019** (0.193) n/a n/a
Deprivation * 2006 0.980** (0.183) n/a n/a
Deprivation * 2005 0.722** (0.151) n/a n/a
Deprivation * 2004 0.225* (0.110) n/a n/a
Dispersion * Deprivation -0.0656** (0.00842) -0.0150 (0.00871)
Dispersion -0.461** (0.135) -0.146 (0.145)
Independent sector hospitals within 60km 0.466** (0.0792) 0.434** (0.120)
year2008 27.25** (4.818) 10.33** (3.565)
year2007 9.380* (4.035) n/a n/a
year2006 19.09** (3.727) n/a n/a
year2005 -1.300 (3.129) n/a n/a
year2004 -1.867 (2.272) n/a n/a
Model 1 Model 2
(Observed competition index) (Predicted competition index)
 
 
Notes to table 3: 
 
1. Results from linear panel data models with fixed effects 
2. Dependent variables: all elective hospital admissions 
3. Unit of analysis: small areas (LSOAs) 
4. Both models include controls for: GPs per 10,000  population, population size, age-sex fractions and 
prevalence of diseases described in Table 1(coefficients not shown). 
5. Baseline: zero deprivation and zero competition areas in 2003.  
6. Dispersion is measured by using the HHI indices of market concentration described in Appendix 1 and  
2. Both indices are re-scaled from -100 (min market dispersion) to 0 (max market dispersion) to 
facilitate the interpretation of the regression results.   
7. Deprivation is measured by using the income domain of the Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2007. 
Scale from 0 to 100, with 100 representing 100% of individuals from households on low income 
benefits. Deprivation is fixed over time, so its effect cannot be separately identified from the fixed 
effects in both models. 
8. Robust standard errors clustered by small areas in parentheses. 
9. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 4 Competition effects on equity in utilisation of elective hospital services across 
small areas. A sensitivity analysis using time-varying income deprivation index  
 
Variables Model 3 
 
(Predicted competition index 
& time varying deprivation index) 
  all elective se 
      
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2008 0.0174** (0.00238) 
Dispersion * 2008 -0.0473 (0.0412) 
Deprivation * 2008 0.887** (0.108) 
Dispersion * Deprivation -0.0122 (0.00783) 
Dispersion -0.225 (0.117) 
Deprivation -0.406 (0.438) 
Independent sector hospitals within 60km 0.426** (0.120) 
year2008 12.44** (3.473) 
 
 
Notes to table 4: 
1. Results from linear panel data models with fixed effects 
2. Dependent variables: all elective hospital admissions 
3. Unit of analysis: small areas (LSOA) 
4. Model includes controls for: GPs per 10,000  population, population size, age-sex fractions and 
prevalence of diseases described in Table 1(coefficients not shown). 
5. Baseline: zero deprivation and zero competition areas in 2003.  
6. Dispersion is measured by using the HHI indices of market concentration described in Appendix 1. the 
index is re-scaled from -100 (min market dispersion) to 0 (max market dispersion) to facilitate the 
interpretation of the regression results.   
7. Deprivation is measured using the income domain of the Economic Deprivation Index 2008. Scale 
from 0 to 100, with 100 representing 100% of individuals aged under 60 from households on low 
income benefits. Time-varying values are only available from 2003 to 2005; we use fixed 2005 values 
as measure of deprivation in 2008. 
8. Robust standard errors clustered by small areas in parentheses. 
9. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 5 Competition effects on equity in utilisation of elective hospital services across 
small areas. A sensitivity analysis using competition index fixed at pre-reform level of 
market dispersion in 2003.  
 
Variables
Coefficients se
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2008 0.0206** (0.00358)
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2007 0.0175** (0.00319)
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2006 0.0152** (0.00300)
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2005 0.00952** (0.00247)
Dispersion * Deprivation * 2004 0.000740 (0.00183)
Dispersion * 2008 0.175* (0.0731)
Dispersion * 2007 0.160* (0.0635)
Dispersion * 2006 0.190** (0.0600)
Dispersion * 2005 -0.0656 (0.0506)
Dispersion * 2004 -0.0273 (0.0378)
Deprivation * 2008 1.462** (0.223)
Deprivation * 2007 1.261** (0.197)
Deprivation * 2006 1.020** (0.184)
Deprivation * 2005 0.650** (0.150)
Deprivation * 2004 0.0897 (0.110)
Dispersion * Deprivation n/a n/a
Dispersion n/a n/a
Independent sector hospitals within 60km 0.365** (0.0794)
year2008 28.77** (4.937)
year2007 9.904* (4.081)
year2006 18.29** (3.769)
year2005 -0.937 (3.148)
year2004 -2.810 (2.275)
Model 4
(Competition index fixed at 2003 values)
 
 
Notes to table 5: 
1. Results from linear panel data models with fixed effects 
2. Dependent variables: all elective hospital admissions 
3. Unit of analysis: small areas (LSOA) 
4. Model includes controls for: GPs per 10,000  population, population size, age-sex fractions and 
prevalence of diseases described in Table 1(coefficients not shown). 
5. Baseline year 2003.  
6. Dispersion is measured by using the HHI index of market concentration fixed at 2003 values. The 
index is re-scaled from -100 (min market dispersion) to 0 (max market dispersion) to facilitate the 
interpretation of the regression results.   
7. Deprivation is measured by using the income domain of the Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2007. 
Scale from 0 to 100, with 100 representing 100% of individuals from households on low income 
benefits. Deprivation is fixed over time, so its effect cannot be separately identified from the fixed 
effects in both models. 
8. Robust standard errors clustered by small areas in parentheses. 
9. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure 1: Heat map of hospital market concentration in the English NHS 
comparing baseline level in 2003 with difference 2003-8 
 
 
Notes to Figure 1 
1. Market concentration is measured using actual HHI on a scale of 0 to 10,000.  The 
calculation of HHI is described in Appendix 2.   
2. The different shades of grey represent deciles of the relevant variable (i.e. HHI 2003 and 
HHI 2008 minus HHI 2003 respectively) 
3. Darker shades thus correspond to less concentrated markets at baseline in 2003, and larger 
reductions in market concentration 2003-8 
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Figure 2: Elective inpatient hospital utilisation by deprivation and dispersion 
(observed rates per 100,000 population) 
 
 
Notes to Figure 2: 
1. “High dispersion” refers to areas with HHI in 2003 < 5,000 (34.3% of areas) and “low dispersion” to 
other areas (65.7% of areas). 
2. “High deprivation” refers to areas with IMD 2007 income deprivation score > 20% (27.8% of areas) 
and “low deprivation” refers to all other areas (72.5% of areas). 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of hospital market dispersion on all elective inpatient 
admissions 
 
 
 
 
Note to Figure 3 
The figures plots the estimated marginal effects reported in table 3 using model 1.
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Appendix 1 
 
The observed competition index is calculated following a three step procedure. We first 
calculate HHI concentration indices at the GP practice level, based on observed shares of 
patients referred by the GP practice to any hospital. This index measures the degree of 
concentration of GP practice referrals for elective admissions for each GP practice in 
England.  
 
In the second step, we calculate HHI indices at the hospital level as a weighted average of the 
HHI scores of all GP practices referring patients to that hospital. The weights are calculated 
using the number of hospital admissions coming from each GP practice.  
 
Finally, we attribute the hospital level HHI indices to each LSOA as weighted average of 
public hospitals located within a 60 km fixed radius distance from the LSOA demographic 
centroid. The weights are inversely proportional to the hospital distance from the LSOA to 
reflect patient willingness to travel: hospitals closer to the LSOA population are given greater 
weight. All hospital within 5 km distance from the LSAO are given same weight. Propper et 
al. (2007) find that 90% of patients for elective admissions travel no further than 60km. 
Almost all LSOAs in England have at least one hospital within 60 km.  The few (about 30) 
LSOAs with no hospitals within 60 km are on the border with Scotland, and most probably 
seek care in Scottish hospitals, so we exclude them from our study.  All hospitals that are 
very close to the LSOA centroid are given same weight, since LSOA residents do not all live 
in the population centroid but are dispersed within this area. In sensitivity analysis, we use 
alternative fix radius indices (30Km and 45Km) and find the completion indices are highly 
correlated and produce very similar results. 
 
41 
 
In order to test whether hospital competition is influenced by GP practice styles, we construct 
an alternative version of the HHI concentration index described above. This index uses 
patient small area of residence as the relevant market unit and is also based on a three step 
procedure. In the first step, we calculate the HHI at the level of patient area of residence 
based on observed shares of patient residents admitted to any hospitals. The second and the 
third steps are the same as in the previous version of the index. We find 90% correlation 
between the two versions of the index and very similar results in the empirical analysis. 
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Appendix 2 
 
The identification of the effect of competition on equity in utilisation is potentially exposed to 
endogeneity bias when using an index of competition based on observed patient flows to 
hospitals. For example, a hospital investing in extra capacity might attract larger patient flows 
by lowering its waiting time, thus influencing both market structure and absolute utilisation 
volume. Moreover, the relationship between patient volumes and patient shares might vary by 
the socioeconomic characteristics of patients. Patients from lower socioeconomic back 
grounds might not be willing to travel long distances and choose a different provider from 
their local hospital (Propper et al., 2006). Finally, patient flows might be affected by 
unobservable characteristics of patient health status, which are potentially correlated with 
their socioeconomic background.  
 
To overcome potential problems of endogeneity, we follow the approach described in Kessler 
and McClelland (2000) and Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) and measure competition using 
patient travel distances that are exogenous to unobserved characteristics of patients and 
hospitals. The predicted competition index at the small area level is obtained following a 
three steps procedure.  
 
In the first step, we specify a model of hospital choice at the patient level as a function of 
exogenous determinants of the patient admission using the following specification of the 
patient indirect utility function (Kessler and McClellan, 2000): 
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    ∑{       [          (     )]          [          (     )]}       ∑ {       }           (2) 
 
The utility of patient i from choosing the hospital j depends on: the relative distance of 
hospitals of a similar h type to hospital j - captured by the vector        in the first term of 
equation 2; the relative distance of hospitals of different type - captured by the vector        
in the second term of equation 2; and the interaction between individual i characteristics,    , 
and hospital j characteristics - the latter are captured by a binary indicator     in the last term 
of equation 2,       if hospital j is of the type h and zero otherwise.  
 
We allow for three different types of hospitals in our model – large public hospitals, teaching 
hospitals, independent sector hospitals. Also, we allow for individual characteristics such as 
patient severity (i.e. patient admitted with just one diagnosis, 2-3 co-diagnoses and more than 
three), patient age (i.e. patients aged from 18-50 and more than 50), patient socioeconomic 
status (i.e. patients from the most income deprived 20% of small areas).  We restrict the 
choice set to all hospitals within 100km fix radius conditional of having at least one hospital 
of each type in the choice set.  
 
The model described in equation 2 is used to predict the probability of each patient 
admission:        (     )     (   )∑    (   )        (3) 
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Where    are the hospitals in the choice set of individual i.  Equation 3 is solved by 
maximising the following log-likelihood function: 
      ∑ ∑     (   )            (4) 
 
We estimate equation 4 using a conditional logit separately for 2003 and 2008.  
 
In the second step, we can calculate the hospital level HHI following Gowrisankaran and 
Town (2003):   ̂      ∑  ̂     ̂            (5) 
With:     ∑  ̂         and     ̂   ∑ ሺ ̂  ሻ       
 
 
Following Kessler and Mclellan (2000) and Gowrisankaran and Town (2003), we exclude 
patient level and hospital level characteristics from the main effects entering equation 2 and 
obtain an index of competition based on exogenous determinants of patient flows rather than 
potentially endogenous factors.  
 
In the third step, we attribute the hospital level competition index obtained from equation 5 to 
small areas using a weighted average of public hospital HHI. We weight the hospitals’ HHI 
by the inverse of their distance to the demographic centroid of the LSOA: 
   ̂      ∑       ̂           (6) 
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We restrict the number of hospitals to be directly included in the LSOA market to those 
falling within a radius of 60km from the small area demographic centroid and attribute an 
equal distance to hospitals located within a radius of 5Km. Fixing the LSOA market radius at 
60Km prevents to artificially inflate the competition of those LSOAs having few hospitals in 
their closest neighbourhood. The contribution of distant hospitals is indirectly included in the 
LSOA market through their competition interactions with local hospitals as described in 
equation 5. In sensitivity analysis, we use alternative fix radius indices (30Km and 45Km) 
and find the completion indices are highly correlated and produce very similar results. 
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